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1. Introduction. This paper proposes that a relation, EXISTENTIAL DEPENDENCY, defines a 
class of nouns and accounts for the infelicity of its members as subjects of locative 
copular sentences and for related definiteness restrictions. This relation is distinguished 
from others, such as (in)alienable possession, on conceptual and empirical grounds.  
In certain environments, words such as "hole" and "flaw" behave differently than 
nouns denoting "ordinary" objects: They may appear as the postverbal NP in the there-
sentence (1) but not as subjects of the “related1” locative copular sentence (2)2. Example 
(2) becomes acceptable if you substitute for “hole” an “ordinary” noun such as "coat" (3), 
or if the noun phrase is definite (4).  
 
(1) There is a hole in my pants 
(2) #A hole is in my pants 
(3) A coat is in the closet 
(4) The hole is in the pants 
Previously unnoticed, to my knowledge, is the fact that valid inferences between 
sentences containing nouns denoting “ordinary” entities with locative prepositions (5) do 
not hold when the noun is existentially dependent (6–8). For these nouns, the location 
denoted by the PP must pick out the (location of the) host. It is not possible to locate an 
existentially dependent object with reference to a larger enclosing region. That is, it is not 
possible to use "There is a hole in the garden" to mean, "There is a hole in the bucket in 
the garden"3. 
(5) There is a ball in the box. 
The box is in the closet. ⊨There is a ball in the closet. (6) There is a hole in the bucket. The bucket is in the closet. ⊭There is a hole in the closet. 
(7) The hole is in the bucket. 
The ball is in the bucket. ⊭The hole and the ball are in the bucket. (8) There is a hole in a bucket.  The bucket is in the garden.  ⊭ There is a hole in the garden. 
2. Existential dependency: Conceptual or grammatical? Although it is tempting to say 
that our conceptual insecurity about entities such as holes, rather than a grammatical 	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1 I	  put	  “related”	  in	  quotes	  because	  these	  facts	  were	  originally	  part	  of	  an	  argument	  against	  a	  transformational	  analysis	  relating	  these	  two	  sentence	  types. 
2 cf. Chomsky 1981; Higgenbotham 1981; Hornstein, Rosen and Uriagereka 1994; Kimball 1973; McNally 
1998; Milsark 1974; Shafer 1995 
3 Notice that even locations corresponding to subparts of the host only marginally allow the transitive 
inference:  
i. The hole is in the pocket. 
The pocket is in the pants. 
⇒?The hole is in the pants. 
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difference, accounts for the facts in (1–4)—after all, it is possible to count holes, compare 
them and demonstratively identify them in the same way as ordinary entities such as 
coats and tables—I believe these facts have a grammatical basis. The hypothesis explored 
here is that explanation for these facts derives from the lexical semantics of this class of 
noun. The meaning I assign this class of nouns incorporates insights about the 
metaphysics of these entities as explored in Casati and Varzi (1994), namely, these 
entities’ existential dependency on a host entity. This relation determines, for these 
entities, essential properties such as existence and (co-)location. By definition (9), a hole 
(flaw, dent, etc.) is in or through something, and the existence of a hole entails the 
existence of a host: 
(9) Hx=df ∃yHxy 
Where Hxy is read as “x is a hole (flaw, dent, etc.) in (or through) y”  
The relation of existential dependency in (9) imposes conditions on the felicitous use of 
these nouns. These conditions say that Hxy expresses a location-dependent property, 
defined in (9). That is, the relation of existential dependence entails the location 
dependence of the dependent noun with respect to the host, as in (10).  
(10) The 2-place relation α expresses the location dependence of an entity x on 
an entity y at interval t: ∀xy[α(x, y) ⟷ ∀l[◻[in(x, l, t) → [in(y, l, t)]]]] where l is a 
variable over locations. 
 
3. Location (in)dependence. The relation in (9) and the conditions in (10) recall 
Chierchia’s (1995) semantics for individual-level predicates (ILPs), which include 
contextually specified felicity conditions on their use. These felicity conditions consist of 
a locative relation Chierchia labels “in”, which captures the tendency of ILPs to hold of 
an individual regardless of his location in space or time. In other words, individual-level 
properties are location independent. For example, the ILP “know” is formalized as in 
(11):  
(11) Know ⇒ λx1 λx2 Gen s [in(x1, x2, s)] [know(x1, x2, s)]  
“A situation s, in which x1 knows x2 holds at any location”  
This semantics for ILPs also captures their infelicity with locative modifiers, as in (12): If 
John knows French at any location, he knows French in the garden, but also elsewhere—
in fact, everywhere.  
(12) #John knows French in the garden. 
=#John knows French (only/when) in the garden. 
Existentially dependent nouns share a number of characteristics with ILPs, and the 
conditions in (10) account for the restrictions on existentially dependent entities and their 
hosts. Existentially dependent entities depend on a host for their location and must be 
located in wherever location the host occupies. Conversely, being a host to the hole is a 
location-independent property and therefore subject to restrictions on locative 
modification like the ILP “know” in (12): If pants have a hole in the kitchen, they will 
have that hole in any location. This is illustrated in (13–14):  
(13) #My pants have a hole in the kitchen. 
(14) #There is a hole in my pants in the kitchen. 
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=#(Only/when) In the kitchen, there is a hole in my pants.  
=There is a hole in my pants that are in the kitchen. ✓ 
 
4. Definiteness and specificity. Indefinite subjects of ILPs and indefinite existentially 
dependent NP subjects both run afoul of these felicity conditions, for different reasons. 
An ILP such as “tall”, inherently generic on Chierchia’s view, prevents an existential 
reading for the indefinite in (17). An indefinite existentially dependent subject of a 
locative predicate (15) is incompatible with the felicity conditions in (10), by suggesting 
that the relation of the hole to the host is not necessary but contingent, thereby implying 
that holes can move around independently of their hosts. 
(15) #A hole is in my pants. 
(16) The hole is in my pants.  
(17) #A woman is tall. 
(18) The woman is tall. 
 
5. NP classes: Possession. The dependency relation between guests and hosts strongly 
resembles that between inalienably possessed entities and their possessors, and that 
relation has been invoked to explain the distribution of this class (Kimball 1973). An 
important result of the semantics in (9), however, is that it distinguishes the relation of 
existential dependency from inalienable possession. This captures a conceptual difference 
between the two kinds of entities. Alienable and inalienable possession are often 
distinguished as contingent and necessary relations, respectively. The hole–host relation 
is contingent from the perspective of the host, because the hole developed or was made 
there, and not somewhere else. The relationship is necessary from the perspective of the 
hole, because without the host it would neither exist nor have location.  
And in fact, it is possible to have existentially dependent entities which are 
inalienably possessed. A donut, for example, is characteristically associated with a single 
hole, and as a result can stand as a complement to a hole-NP in a genitive of-phrase (19). 
(In this case, the of-phrase is infelicitous when it is indefinite because we know donuts 
have just one [characteristic] hole [cf. 20]). When the hole is not a characteristic part of 
the host, the of-phrase is infelicitous (21).  
(19) The hole of the donut 
(20) #A hole of the donut 
(21) #The/#A hole of the cupboard 
When the hole-NP is combined instead with a locative PP headed by “in”, on the other 
hand, the head of the PP need not be relational (24)4. In this case, it is left open whether 
or not the hole is characteristic or not, but it will tend to be interpreted as an 
uncharacteristic hole. The hole in (23) could, for example, be a hole other than the 
characteristic hole of the donut. 
(22) The hole in the donut 
(23) A hole in the donut 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Possessive structures with “with” (e.g. A donut with a hole in it) and have-sentences (e.g. The donut has a 
hole in it) also suggest uncharacteristic holes. Compound nouns pattern with “of”, requiring a characteristic 
hole–host relation (e.g. the donut hole/#the cupboard hole). 
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(24) A hole in the closet 
 
6. Nominal interpretation in copular and existential there-sentences. Finally, consider 
(1) and (2). It has been argued on independent grounds in much recent work on 
existential there-sentences that the relationship between the existentially dependent NP 
and the locative is different in these examples. In (1), the locative PP can be analyzed as 
an NP modifier of the postverbal NP or as an adjunct predicate (cf. Barwise and Cooper 
1981; Francez 2007; Hazout 2004; McNally 1998; Williams 1984, 1994). Importantly, 
the relationship between the existentially dependent NP and the locative in (1) is, 
arguably, not that of subject and predicate, as it is in the infelicitous (2); also, the source 
of the existential import in these cases is different. McNally (1998), among others, has 
argued that there is no existential quantification in existential there-sentences—an 
analysis that receives new support from the facts presented here.   
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